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Federal Regulation of Third-Party 
Litigation Finance 
 
Third-party litigation finance has become a powerful and 
influential industry that will continue to play a significant role in 
shaping the legal landscape for years to come. The opportunities—and 
challenges—introduced by this burgeoning industry are legion, and with 
them has come a swath of disparate state regulations. These regimes 
have failed to balance important consumer- and commercial-lending 
protections with facilitation of the growth of an industry that is essential 
to increasing access to the courtroom. 
In response, this Note contends that a federal agency, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, should be delegated the 
authority to promulgate regulations (1) capping interest rates at a 
percentage in line with fair commercial practices, (2) expressly 
prohibiting financier control over litigation decisions, and (3) limiting 
the information that financiers can request from their clients. 
Additionally, this Note proposes amending the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to mandate disclosure of litigation-finance agreements in all 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is worth reminding ourselves 
that litigation is expensive and that litigants often struggle to meet the 
expenses of the moment while they await disposition of their cases. To 
bridge this gap, plaintiffs and defendants alike are increasingly turning 
to a relatively new source of liquidity: their legal claims. This practice 
is known as third-party litigation financing (“TPLF”), and it occurs 
when someone other than the party, the party’s attorney, or a party 
with a preexisting contractual relationship (i.e., an indemnitor or 
insurer) agrees to provide financing for a dispute.1 The financing is for 
profit and is generally nonrecourse, which means that a party is 
obligated to repay the “investment” only if its lawsuit is successful.2 
TPLF is based on the notion that a legal claim can be treated as an 
investment, wherein financiers stand to realize immense profits3 
through an investment unlike the stock market or any other asset 
class.4  
 
 1. Although there is no universally accepted definition of third-party litigation finance, such 
agreements share several common traits. See Bernardo M. Cremades Román, Jr., Usury and Other 
Defenses in U.S. Litigation Finance, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 151–52 (2014) (“Third-party 
funding agreements typically share five common requirements: (i) a cash advance; (ii) made by a 
non-party; (iii) in exchange for a share of the litigation or arbitration proceeds; (iv) whether in 
settlement or judgment or award; and (v) payable at the time of recovery if, and only if, such 
recovery takes place.”). 
 2. Id. at 151. 
 3. For example, Burford Capital, the world’s largest litigation financier, reported in 2017 
that “[i]n those eight years [since Burford was founded], Burford ha[d] gone from an £80 million 
start-up to one of the 250 largest public companies listed in London with a market capitalisation 
well in excess of $2 billion.” BURFORD CAPITAL, 2017 INTERIM REPORT 3 (2017), 
http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BUR-27947-Interim-Report-2017_ 
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q23A-37HM]. 
 4. See Anne Rodgers et al., Emerging Issues in Third-Party Litigation Funding: What 
Antitrust Lawyers Need to Know, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2016, art. 2, at 1–2, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec16_full_source.aut
hcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NCP-A4F4] (examining the unique opportunities presented by 
lawsuit investment). 
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Individuals and corporate entities alike are drawn to this 
newfound source of liquidity in their claims for many reasons. TPLF 
plays a significant role in providing access to the courtroom for many 
types of parties—from the relatively unsophisticated personal-injury 
plaintiff needing to keep the bills paid until her claim is resolved, to the 
sophisticated large company seeking capital to offset the risk and hefty 
expense of litigation.5 Litigants’ interests in funding, paired with 
investors’ potential for immense returns on investment, have spurred 
the expansion of the litigation-finance industry, with the bulk of 
investments lying in almost all areas of commercial litigation.6 
Litigation finance is a rapidly evolving industry that infuses 
billions of dollars into the judicial system every year, and yet no 
comprehensive scheme of regulation has emerged in response.7 At 
present, regulation of this industry consists of a patchwork of state 
statutes and judicial decisions under which access to funding varies 
dramatically. In states like Florida, New York, Ohio, and Texas, 
litigation funding is expressly permitted and widely available.8 By 
embracing TPLF, these states have exposed themselves to a range of 
problems, including the potential for increases in both frivolous 
lawsuits and undue influence by financiers over litigation decisions.9 In 
other states, like Alabama, Colorado, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania, 
litigation finance is either severely restricted or altogether unlawful.10 
 
 5. See Michael Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous Litigation, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. 195, 195–96 (2014) (“Typically, a litigation finance company will give a plaintiff 
who otherwise might not be able to afford a lawsuit the funds needed to cover legal expenses.”). 
 6. See Rodgers et al., supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the litigation-finance industry’s ventures 
into a broad range of commercial cases). 
 7. See Paul Barrett, The Business of Litigation Finance Is Booming, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-30/ 
the-business-of-litigation-finance-is-booming [https://perma.cc/FZ3F-VQBA] (noting that Burford 
Capital had $378 million in new litigation investments in 2016 and that “Burford alone has more 
than $2 billion in capital invested or available to be invested”); Elizabeth Olson, Lack of Capital to 
Lead Law Firms to Seek Help, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/05/04/business/dealbook/lack-of-capital-to-lead-law-firms-to-seek-help-survey-finds.html 
[https://perma.cc/97Y9-TZAR] (discussing the results of a litigation-finance survey indicating that 
more companies will begin utilizing litigation finance to “fuel growth”). 
 8. Texas is one example of a state regime that is friendly to litigation finance. It does not 
regulate litigation finance and has case law permitting litigation-finance agreements. See Anglo-
Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 101, 104–05 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that 
litigation-funding contracts that permit an investor to recover only if the client recovers are neither 
usurious nor contrary to Texas public policy). For further discussion of how these states regulate 
TPLF, see infra Section III.B. 
 9. For further discussion of concerns and criticisms related to permitting litigation finance, 
see infra Part II. 
 10. For an example of a state regime that restricts access to litigation funding, see Boling v. 
Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00081-GNS-HBB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48098, at 
*14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2017) (holding that litigation-finance contracts violate a Kentucky statute 
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The lack of access to litigation funding in such states works to deprive 
plaintiffs of an effective means of bringing meritorious claims.11 
In light of the important interests at play in this burgeoning 
industry, this Note advocates for the implementation of federal TPLF 
regulation. This Note contends that there are many desirable aspects of 
litigation finance and that a federal regulatory solution is the best 
means of promoting these beneficial aspects while mitigating potential 
downsides.12  
Two chief principles guide this venture. First, regulation of 
TPLF must occur at the federal level. The current multitude of state 
regimes creates a demonstrable lack of uniformity in consumer 
protection and access to funding.13 Uniformity is desirable both to 
protect equal access to the courtroom and to ensure that financiers 
across the United States are subject to the same consumer-protection 
standards. Further, TPLF is well suited to federal regulation because it 
functions in a manner very similar to, and therefore poses many of the 
same issues as, those sorts of loan, investment, and credit 
arrangements that the federal government has long had a hand in 
regulating.14 Essential regulatory and procedural safeguards must be 
put in place at the federal level to uniformly protect the interests of both 
consumers and the TPLF industry. Second, there is an inherent tension 
between protecting consumer interests and promoting the business 
interests of the TPLF industry. The palatability of regulation for all 
parties involved, insofar as a regulatory proposal might be successfully 
implemented, depends on protecting properly defined consumer 
interests without unduly hampering the TPLF industry’s ability to 
operate and grow. 
Specifically, this Note proposes that the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) be charged with administering the TPLF 
regulatory regime. To successfully effect the aforementioned guiding 
principles, three regulatory safeguards must be implemented: (1) 
interest rates must be brought in line with fair commercial practices, 
 
proscribing champerty). For further discussion of how these states regulate TPLF, see infra 
Section III.A. 
 11. For further discussion on concerns related to limiting access to litigation funding, see 
infra Part II. 
 12. This Note assumes that the litigation-finance industry has become so fixed in the U.S. 
judicial system that it will continue to play an important role in shaping the judicial landscape, 
even though the practice remains contentious. This Note thus primarily analyzes how TPLF 
should take place; for a discussion of why TPLF should be permitted, as well as common criticisms 
of TPLF, see infra Part II. 
 13. For further discussion of the varying state approaches to TPLF, including how these 
approaches impact consumer protection and access to funding, see infra Part III. 
 14. For an analysis of how TPLF is similar to other areas that are subject to federal 
regulation, see infra Part IV. 
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(2) financier control over litigation decisions must be expressly 
prohibited, and (3) the information that financiers can request from 
their clients must be limited so as to avoid conflict-of-interest issues 
related to attorney work product and the attorney-client privilege. 
Additionally, this Note proposes an amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure that would mandate disclosure of TPLF agreements in 
all litigation. 
Part I examines the historical foundation and modern practice 
of litigation finance. Part II then identifies the most important issues 
in the TPLF debate and concludes that litigation financing is a 
desirable practice. Part III illustrates the multitude of ways in which 
states have implemented TPLF regulation. Finally, Part IV considers 
the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate 
litigation finance under the Commerce Clause; details why federal 
regulation is preferable to state; and proposes the aforementioned 
federal regulatory scheme, which would protect the interests of 
consumers and litigation financiers as well as the integrity of the 
judicial system as a whole.  
I. TPLF PAST AND PRESENT: CHAMPERTY, USURY, AND THE MODERN 
FORM 
To understand how and why litigation finance is used today, it 
is helpful to first understand how TPLF developed historically. This 
review begins with the often-forgotten common law doctrines of 
champerty and maintenance and the evolution of usury law. 
A. Historical Bars to TPLF: The Prohibition on Champertous 
Agreements 
At common law, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance 
have long prohibited the practice of TPLF.15 Maintenance is defined as 
“[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a 
litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case” or, in 
other words, the act of “meddling in someone else’s litigation.”16 
Champerty is a form of maintenance and refers to “[a]n agreement 
between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which 
the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for 
 
 15. See Jacqueline Sheridan, Champerty and Maintenance in the Modern Era, DINSMORE 
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.dinsmore.com/publications/champerty-and-maintenance-in-the-
modern-era [https://perma.cc/L7CX-CEG2]. 
 16. Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”17 In total, “maintenance is 
helping another prosecute a suit,” and “champerty is maintaining a suit 
in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”18 
These doctrines originated in ancient Greek and Roman 
societies and were later incorporated into English medieval law.19 It 
was long believed that “a controversy properly concerned only the 
persons actually involved in the original transaction,” and thus a 
general prohibition was observed that the intermeddling of a third 
party in a lawsuit voided the suit.20  
These doctrines were incorporated into U.S. common law, but 
over time, they have weakened such that courts today are far less 
willing than their historical antecedents were to invalidate an 
agreement as champertous. Near the end of the nineteenth century, 
some courts began upholding agreements that were traditionally 
viewed as champertous. For example, in 1891, the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Brown v. Bigne held that an agreement by a third party to fund 
a suit was not champertous where a third party was induced by the 
plaintiff to fund the suit because the plaintiff could not fund the 
litigation himself.21 Judge Bean neatly summarized the shifting view in 
the United States, noting that in England, “[s]o great was the evil of 
rich and powerful barons buying up claims, . . . that it became 
necessary . . . to prevent such practices, and to invoke in all its rigor the 
doctrine against champerty and maintenance.”22 But with regard to the 
United States, Judge Bean stated:  
In this country, where no aristocracy or privileged class elevated above the mass of the 
people has ever existed, and the administration of justice has been alike impartial to all 
without regard to rank or station, the reason for the ancient doctrine of champerty and 
maintenance does not exist, and hence has not found favor in the United States.23 
The Brown v. Bigne court found that while a majority of the states 
continued to observe the doctrine of champerty, others had disregarded 
it entirely.24 The court concluded that agreements that would 
traditionally be viewed as champertous are “not unlawful, unless . . . 
made for the mere purpose or desire of perpetuating strife and 
litigation.”25 
 
 17. Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 18. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978). 
 19. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 48 (1935). 
 20. Id. at 54. 
 21. 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891). 
 22. Id. at 12. 
 23. Id. at 12–13. 
 24. Id. at 13. 
 25. Id. 
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This trend continued gaining steam, and during the latter 
decades of the twentieth century, contingency fees became widely 
recognized and accepted as an exception to champerty.26 Today, as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently noted, “The 
consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding, 
champerty’s reach.”27 TPLF has proven to be no exception to this trend, 
as nearly half of all states now allow some form of litigation finance.28 
Through this doctrinal relaxation, TPLF agreements have risen to 
prominence as a form of “permissible champerty,” though allowance of 
such agreements varies immensely among the states.29  
For example, a Delaware superior court recently held that a 
plaintiff’s agreement with a litigation funder, wherein the plaintiff 
received funding in exchange for a percentage of any future proceeds of 
the litigation, was not barred as champertous because the plaintiff 
retained ownership of the claim and the funder was given no authority 
to maintain the claim.30 But in a Kentucky case involving a very similar 
funding arrangement, a federal district court held that a state statute 
proscribing champerty barred litigation-funding agreements.31 
B. Historical Bars to TPLF: The Prohibition on Usury 
Usury is defined as “the charging of an illegal rate of interest as 
a condition to lending money.”32 Under English law, the charging of any 
interest rate was illegal until the sixteenth century, at which time 
 
 26. See Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (dismissing 
claim in a case involving a contingency fee agreement because “there [was] no allegation that [the 
attorney] undertook to pay or protect the client from payment of the costs and expenses of 
litigation, an essential element of champerty properly pleaded”). 
 27. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 28. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 122 (2011) (noting 
that “almost half of the jurisdictions in the United States allow some form of profit maintenance, 
and a few arguably have lifted all restrictions on maintenance under their common law”). 
 29. For further discussion of the various statutory and judicial actions that states have taken 
with regard to TPLF agreements, see infra Part III. 
 30. See Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. N07C-12-134-
JRJ, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 118, at *8–12 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2016) (holding that plaintiff 
was the “the bona fide owner of the claims in this litigation, and [litigation funder] Burford has no 
right to maintain this action”). 
 31. Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00081-GNS-HBB, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 48098, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2017). 
 32. Usury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In Wilkie v. Roosevelt, 3 Johns. Cas. 
206, 206–07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802), Judge Thompson helpfully stated: 
Usury consists in extorting or taking a rate of interest for money, beyond what is 
allowed by law. It is not necessary that money should be actually advanced, in order to 
constitute the offence of usury, but any pretence or contrivance whatever, to gain more 
than legal interest, where it is the intent of the parties to contract for a loan, will make 
that contract usurious.  
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courts began to enforce loans with interest rates below the usury 
ceiling—ten percent at the time.33 The usury ceiling continued declining 
over the next several centuries, reaching a low point of five percent in 
the nineteenth century.34 As Professor Eric Posner has noted, “[P]arties 
at all times attempted to contract around the usury ceiling, but the 
courts of equity generally resisted the most obvious attempts at evasion, 
and the evidence indicates that the usury laws did restrict the small 
loan market.”35 In the United States, most states today have passed 
statutes establishing maximum interest rates (ranging from six to 
twenty percent)—which typically vary depending on the type of 
agreement—and penalties for usury.36 
As early as 1830, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the elements 
of a usurious transaction.37 Establishing usury generally requires a 
showing of (1) a loan or forbearance of money, (2) an absolute obligation 
to repay the principal (not contingent on any event), and (3) greater 
compensation for the loan (e.g., interest) than is allowed under 
statute.38 Litigation-funding agreements are typically structured as 
nonrecourse so as to avoid the second requirement, but such a structure 
has not always been entirely successful in protecting TPLF agreements 
from usury law.39 
Because TPLF agreements are generally nonrecourse, courts 
have largely construed them as financing agreements rather than as 
loans.40 Bernardo Cremades has argued that the underlying rationale 
rests on “the inherent contingent nature of such contracts or, more 
precisely, the risk born [sic] by the lender.”41 Cremades notes that 
“[s]uch risk, however, must be substantial and thus a mere colorable 
hazard will not preclude excessive interest charges from being 
usurious.”42 To avoid usury, a lender must be “subject to some greater 
 
 33. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
283, 312 (1995). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Cremades, supra note 1, at 160. 
 37. See Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 205, 224 (1830) (identifying the requisite elements 
necessary to establish a usurious transaction as (1) “[a] loan either express or implied”; (2) “[a]n 
understanding that the money lent shall or may be returned”; and (3) “[t]hat a greater rate of 
interest than is allowed by the statute, shall be paid”). 
 38. See Cremades, supra note 1, at 160. 
 39. See Bernardo M. Cremades Román, Implications of Usury in Third-Party Litigation 
Funding, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/ 
implications-of-usury-in-third-party-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/47TJ-82V3]. 
 40. Cremades, supra note 1, at 162. 
 41. Cremades, supra note 39. 
 42. Id. 
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hazard than the mere risk that the borrower might fail to repay the loan 
or that the security might depreciate in value,” and to that end, some 
courts have found that litigation poses a substantial risk.43  
Other courts have relied on usury laws to void TPLF agreements 
with excessive interest rates. For example, a New York trial court in a 
strict liability labor case found “low, if any risk” of the litigation funder 
not recovering and thought it “ludicrous to consider this transaction 
anything else but a loan.”44 In North Carolina, a state court of appeals 
found that a TPLF agreement was an investment but concluded that 
the investment constituted a “cash advance” subject to the state’s usury 
law.45 In total, the application of usury law to TPLF agreements, much 
like the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, varies significantly 
from state to state. 
C. Defining the Modern Forms of TPLF 
Today, TPLF comprises two chief funding subindustries—
consumer and commercial—each with its own unique funding 
arrangements for different types of clients.46 TPLF is typically provided 
to plaintiffs but is also available to defendants. The latter form is far 
less common, as it is considerably more difficult to value the likelihood 
of “success” for a defendant.47  
Plaintiff funding is typically nonrecourse, which means that a 
plaintiff has no obligation to repay an advance if he loses his suit. Only 
if there is a recovery may the financier take the agreed-upon percentage 
along with interest accrued on the loan amount.48 Defendant funding is 
generally structured as a reverse contingency fee, “whereby the capital 
provider receives an interest in the differential between a defendant’s 
exposure and the amount of the claim that is ultimately paid.”49 For 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 894, at *22–23 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005). 
 45. Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 46. Cremades, supra note 1, at 155. 
 47. See Guide to Litigation Financing, WESTFLEET ADVISORS 3–4, 
http://westfleetadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/WA-Guide-to-Litigation-Financing.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/SJ5Z-MPYX] (discussing the types of parties and 
claims that typically receive TPLF). 
 48. See FAQ, BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/3UKH-BH3Z] (“Our capital is almost always non-recourse—meaning that we do 
not earn an investment return if the underlying litigation is unsuccessful.”); Our Value 
Proposition, JURIDICA INV. LTD, http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica/our-value-
proposition (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9TTY-2R9L] (stating that Juridica 
provides nonrecourse capital to businesses and law firms). 
 49. See Guide to Litigation Financing, supra note 47, at 3 (detailing how defendant TPLF is 
used); see also Michael McDonald, Litigation Finance for Defendants, ABOVE L. (Mar. 28, 2017, 
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both plaintiff and defendant financing, the TPLF model allows parties 
to shift the risk of an unsuccessful suit to the litigation financier.50 
TPLF is appealing primarily because it allows litigants to 
eliminate some of the risk of an unsuccessful suit. For TPLF to work as 
a business model, then, financiers must be able to evaluate the risk they 
are assuming; this includes the likelihood of both recovering litigation 
costs and profiting from their investments.51 To determine whether a 
risk is justified, TPLF providers engage in a process of due diligence, 
the depth of which varies depending on the type of funding sought and 
the complexity of the claim. 
1. Consumer-Litigation Financing 
Consumer-litigation finance deals primarily with personal-
injury, divorce, and small claims in which the plaintiff is typically not 
well funded.52 During the course of litigation, and occasionally after 
resolution,53 a plaintiff can receive nonrecourse funding at the cost of 
principal plus interest and fees out of the proceeds of the lawsuit.54 The 
funding advanced usually ranges from $500 to $100,000, and interest 
 
5:31 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/litigation-finance-for-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D6V7-KRUW] (“If the litigation finance firm wants to [fund a defendant], they assign an expected 
loss or damages amount to the case. Then any amount below the expected damages is the value 
generated by the litigation finance firm, which gets a portion of that value.”). 
 50. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 6 (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ 
20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AJH8-EL97] [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER]. 
 51. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED 
STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 1, 24 (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCL5-PEKU] (“The main 
costs of ALF [alternative-litigation-financing] suppliers associated with a particular deal are costs 
associated with evaluating prospects for repayment (i.e., due diligence costs) and opportunity costs 
of capital (i.e., costs associated with having money tied up).” (emphasis omitted) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 52. See Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 460 
(2012) (noting that consumer-TPLF clients are typically less sophisticated than commercial-TPLF 
clients). 
 53. In some cases, it can take from several weeks to several years for a settlement to be paid, 
which prompts consumers in need of financial support to seek funding after the disposition of their 
cases. See Post-Settlement Lawsuit Funding for Plaintiffs, BALANCED BRIDGE FUNDING, 
https://www.balancedbridge.com/post-settlement-plaintiff-funding (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/5P6R-2AFQ] (detailing the process of obtaining post-settlement funding). 
 54. See Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another Form of 
Payday Lending?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2017, at 117, 117. 
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rates vary from two to fifteen percent per month (resulting in annual 
percentage rates55 of over two hundred percent).56  
Financing can be obtained in person or online, where a financier 
gauges the strength of a consumer’s case by looking to factors such as 
the amount of potential damages, the likelihood of gaining a profitable 
settlement or winning at trial, and whether the consumer owes other 
debts or attorney’s fees that would need to be satisfied first.57 Upon 
recovery and after all other debts and obligations are paid, the attorney 
disburses repayment to the financier. 
Consumer-TPLF plaintiffs are generally referred to as 
“unsophisticated,” meaning they do not possess the same level of 
negotiating power as do larger commercial entities or law firms.58 
Scholars have expressed concern that this asymmetry exposes 
consumers to a greater risk of abusive practices than their commercial 
counterparts.59 Such practices generally consist of either influence over 
litigation strategy or the charging of exorbitant interest rates, which 
would typically be illegal were this type of finance governed by most 
states’ usury laws.60  
Due diligence in consumer-litigation financing is fairly 
straightforward. It involves an assessment of the likelihood of a claim’s 
success and any relevant debts that will need to be paid from the 
proceeds of the suit.61 Because the average financing involved in 
consumer litigation is low, the amount of money a financier would be 
willing to spend on due diligence is also relatively low.62 Predictably, 
reduced diligence results in a less complete picture of a plaintiff’s 
 
 55. Annual percentage rate (“APR”) is “[t]he actual cost of borrowing money, expressed in the 
form of an annualized interest rate.” Annual Percentage Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 56. Skiba & Xiao, supra note 54, at 122. 
 57. See id. at 122–23. 
 58. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Litigation Finance Ethics: Paying 
Interest, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 17–18 (suggesting that allowing private lenders to exercise a certain 
degree of control over litigation strategy may violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); see 
also Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 
615, 648–49 (2007) (stating that numerous state bar associations and jurisdictions have issued 
opinions offering guidance on the ethical limits of third-party financiers’ ability to control litigation 
strategy). 
 59. See McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 627 (discussing how legal scholarship has supported 
the use of litigation-finance agreements, despite “the unequal bargaining position of the customer 
and the LFC [litigation financier], the financial duress prompting the customer to sign an LLA 
[litigation-funding agreement], the usurious profit reaped by the LFCs, and the ethical pressures 
placed on the attorney-client relationship”). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Skiba & Xiao, supra note 54, at 123. 
 62. See GARBER, supra note 51, at 24–25 (noting that in consumer TPLF, “individual 
transactions in this segment are fairly small, perhaps in the range of $1,750 to $4,500”). 
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likelihood of success, which increases the risk to consumer financiers 
through variations in returns on their portfolios.63 For those consumer-
TPLF providers with sufficient capital to fund many suits at once, 
however, “portfolio risk—that is, variation in the returns on the 
portfolio—can be fairly small because of risk pooling across deals.”64 
2. Commercial-Litigation Financing 
Commercial-litigation finance is typically arranged for disputes 
involving antitrust, intellectual property, and business-contract 
issues.65 Commercial-TPLF financiers normally provide funding 
directly to corporate plaintiffs in exchange for a share of the recovery, 
though funding may be extended to defendants as well.66  
Commercial-TPLF clients employ TPLF services for several 
reasons. One is that TPLF can be used as a financing technique for 
budgetary or accounting-management purposes (where the party could 
afford the litigation costs otherwise).67 Another reason commercial 
plaintiffs use TPLF is to overcome financial constraints in pursuing 
litigation.68 This rationale typically applies to smaller businesses or 
individuals with commercial interests who could not ordinarily afford 
litigation.69 TPLF can also be used “to obtain assessments of the legal 
merits and likely economic values of their claims to supplement those 
provided by their outside counsel.”70 Further, because obtaining 
financing may indicate to opposing parties that a claim has been judged 
to have considerable merit, “some companies might accept [TPLF] (and 
reveal this to the other side) in hopes of strengthening their bargaining 
positions in settlement negotiations.”71 
Investments in commercial-litigation finance tend to be much 
larger than in the consumer context, and financiers stand to obtain 
immense returns on their investments. While it is difficult to obtain 
information about the dealings of most commercial-litigation financiers, 
there is substantial information available about Burford Capital (the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Steinitz, supra note 52, at 460.  
 66. See GARBER, supra note 51, at 13. 
 67. See Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 711, 716–17 (2014). Because wealthier individuals possess more capital and are generally 
more aware of their negotiating power, they are more “sophisticated” in the sense that they can 
even out their bargaining position relative to litigation financiers. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. GARBER, supra note 51, at 15. 
 71. Id. 
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world’s largest provider of commercial TPLF) and Juridica 
Investments, because both of these companies are subject to disclosure 
requirements as publicly traded corporations. Burford and Juridica 
both generally deal with large, wealthy companies that are seeking at 
least $2 million in funding. Burford’s website indicates that “[c]lients, 
firms and Burford get the best value when the amount requested is at 
least $2 million. Most of our investments are between $4 and $10 
million, and some are significantly larger.”72 Juridica’s website states 
that “[i]nvestment size typically ranges from US $2,000,000 to US 
$10,000,000, although larger investments in exceptional opportunities 
or a portfolio of opportunities are made.”73 
Litigation-funding arrangements by Bentham IMF, another of 
the world’s largest litigation financiers, provide one example of what 
commercial-TPLF agreements can look like. In a typical funding 
agreement for a single case, “Bentham will pay 50 percent of the client’s 
legal fees in exchange for 20 percent of any recovery. The law firm 
agrees to defer the other 50 percent of its fees in exchange for also 
receiving a 20 percent interest in the recovery.”74  
Commercial-TPLF clients are generally more “sophisticated” 
than those in consumer financing. These clients include both companies 
and wealthy individuals who possess more resources than do consumer-
TPLF clients and are more likely to recognize the negotiating power in 
their claims.75 Because the parties in commercial TPLF have essentially 
equal negotiating power, it is far less likely that financiers will be able 
to take advantage of clients through excessive interest rates. 
Nevertheless, commercial TPLF still raises concerns of increased 
frivolous litigation and undue influence over litigation strategy.76 
In the commercial context, the due diligence process is much 
more involved. Not only is there far more money on the line, but the 
litigation at issue in commercial TPLF tends to be more complex than 
in its consumer counterpart.77 Thus, the cost of due diligence tends to 
be much higher. For example, Burford builds a comprehensive “risk 
 
 72. Emily O. Slater, Demystifying the Litigation Finance Diligence Process, BURFORD (Sept. 
18, 2017), http://www.burfordcapital.com/blog/demystifying-litigation-finance-diligence 
[https://perma.cc/BR83-DWFH]. 
 73. Investment Policy, JURIDICA INV. LTD, http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-
juridica/investment-policy.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/32GE-R3PF]. 
 74. Joan C. Rogers, Litigation Funding on Rise in Big Cases, Panel Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
23, 2017), https://www.bna.com/litigation-funding-rise-n57982085617 [https://perma.cc/J23B-
4VB7]. 
 75. See Steinitz & Field, supra note 67, at 716.  
 76. For further discussion of the criticisms of commercial-litigation funding, see infra Section 
II.B. 
 77. GARBER, supra note 51, at 26. 
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profile” for each client that assesses six separate criteria: (1) type of 
matter, (2) strength of the merits, (3) experience of counsel, (4) 
jurisdiction, (5) amount of capital required, and (6) expected recovery.78  
Juridica engages in a similar process, where “[u]ltimately, 
Juridica seeks to invest in claims that are likely to be resolved through 
settlement in a reasonable time frame.”79 In 2010, Juridica’s chairman 
and CEO stated that the due diligence process is “a very detailed and 
expensive process, averaging about 60 to 90 days” and that “Juridica 
spends an average of $75,000–$100,000 for each screening.”80 This 
expense can include the enlistment of outside legal resources for specific 
practice areas and economic and financial consultants to evaluate 
damages.81 
II. COMMON OBJECTIONS TO TPLF 
In February 2012, the ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 filed 
a white paper with the ABA House of Delegates that detailed the impact 
of TPLF on legal ethics.82 The Commission found that “[t]he market for 
alternative litigation finance involves suppliers and customers who 
demand this form of financing” and that the use of TPLF “will 
undoubtedly continue to evolve.”83 Though ambivalent about the use of 
TPLF generally, the Commission reached essentially the same 
conclusion as this Note: that the TPLF industry is likely to continue 
growing and that special steps must be taken to protect clients using 
TPLF services.  
The Commission limited its recommendations to legal ethics 
alone, but many of the ethical concerns they identified are helpful to 
both understanding what motivated the current patchwork of state 
 
 78. According to Burford Capital’s website, their risk profile includes an evaluation of 
whether 
[t]he case does not turn on a “he-said-she-said” credibility determination[, t]here is more 
than one viable legal theory that could lead to a recovery[, t]he legal theory is tested 
and has good support in statutory or case-law[, t]he case theory makes sense in the 
commercial context of the transaction or course of dealing[, t]he damages theory can be 
reasonably extrapolated from past performance of the damaged company or there is an 
established contract, statutory or royalty rate[, and t]he economics of the investment 
do not depend on the case settling early or on obtaining treble damages[.]  
Slater, supra note 72. 
 79. See Investment Policy, supra note 73. 
 80. Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source for Major Commercial 
Lawsuits, FULBROOK CAP. MGMT., LLC (Mar. 10, 2010), https://fulbrookmanagement.com/third-
party-investors-offer-new-funding-source-for-major-commercial-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/39WX-
8PQX]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50. 
 83. Id. at 39. 
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regulations84 and formulating an overarching federal regulatory 
solution.85 To meaningfully approach these matters, it is useful, then, 
to first address the arguments supporting and opposing the practice of 
TPLF. This Part examines the most common arguments on both sides 
of the TPLF debate and explains why the criticisms are not 
insurmountable barriers to the use of litigation financing. 
A. Increased Filing of Frivolous Claims 
The oldest and most common objection to litigation finance is 
that the practice may increase the filing of frivolous claims. The 
Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”) has argued that “TPLF companies 
are mere investors—and they base their funding decisions on the 
present value of their expected return, of which the likelihood of success 
at trial is only one component.”86 The ILR argues that because litigation 
financiers can spread risk over a large number of cases in their 
portfolios, TPLF providers “can be expected to have higher risk 
appetites than most contingency-fee attorneys and to be more willing to 
back claims of questionable merit.”87 
In terms of commercial-litigation finance, concerns over 
frivolous litigation are entirely unfounded. Commercial-TPLF 
financiers engage in an expensive and time-consuming process of due 
diligence to ensure that claims are precisely the opposite of frivolous.88 
The objective of these financiers is to see a return on their investments, 
and investing in suits that already have a high likelihood of being 
dismissed during the pleadings or disposed of on summary judgment 
would make for a poor business practice.89 To the contrary, then, the 
due diligence process yields the positive effect of promoting meritorious 
claims and facilitates the bringing of these claims.90 
 
 84. See infra Part III. 
 85. See infra Part IV. 
 86. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL 
TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 4 (2012), 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
W4FS-X4A2]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See supra Section I.C.2 (examining the due diligence process in commercial-litigation 
funding). 
 89. See Douglas R. Richmond, Litigation Funding: Investing, Lending, or Loan Sharking?, 
2005 SYMP. ISSUE PROF. LAW. 17, 27 (noting that “funding companies have no incentive to advance 
money to plaintiffs whose lawsuits might reasonably be described as frivolous because their chance 
of recovery is low”). 
 90. See id. (“[B]ecause the merits of a case exist independent of a plaintiff’s ability to afford 
litigation, prohibiting litigation funding will in some instances discourage meritorious lawsuits.”). 
Popp_Galley (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  11:04 PM 
742 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:727 
Concerns about an increase in frivolous litigation are more 
salient in the consumer-TPLF context because of the model on which 
consumer financiers operate, but this is largely inconsequential. 
Although consumer financiers could conceivably be more likely to invest 
in frivolous suits because of both their ability to spread risk across many 
claims and their lesser ability to engage in due diligence, it is not at all 
obvious that relatively simpler consumer claims require the heightened 
diligence of commercial TPLF to serve this gatekeeping function. 
Moreover, other mechanisms prevent the filing and maintenance of 
frivolous litigation. 
One such mechanism is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. At 
the federal level, lawyers are required to certify that submissions to the 
court are not presented for an improper purpose, that arguments are 
nonfrivolous or supported by existing law, and that factual assertions 
have or are likely to have evidentiary support.91 Failing to observe the 
rule can result in a range of sanctions, which include “nonmonetary 
directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion 
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to 
the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other 
expenses directly resulting from the violation.”92 Many states have 
adopted a similar rule and provide for similar sanctions.93 
Another mechanism to prevent frivolous lawsuits is the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which most states have adopted 
in some form.94 Rule 3.1 requires that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which 
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law.”95 In the TPLF context, this rule and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 both serve to prevent frivolous litigation by 
 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). 
 93. See, e.g., MASS. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“The signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, 
and belief there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.”); TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 13 (requiring that the signature of attorneys or parties certify “to the best of their 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not 
groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment” and 
that violators be held guilty of contempt). 
 94. For a list of states that have adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see 
Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pro
fessional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html [https://perma.cc/W4GD-P463]. 
Most states, however, amended the rules upon or after adoption. See Jurisdictional Rules 
Comparison Charts, A.B.A. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html [https://perma.cc/2SZY-2PP4]. 
 95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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disincentivizing lawyers from bringing such suits, thus limiting the 
ability of TPLF financiers to back them. 
B. Improper Influence over Litigation Strategy 
  Another common objection to litigation finance involves TPLF’s 
possible influence on litigation decisions and settlement incentives. 
This influence could be effected through two means. First, as the ILR 
has noted, “[T]he TPLF company [as an investor in a plaintiff’s lawsuit] 
presumably will seek to protect its investment, and can be expected to 
try to exert control over the plaintiff’s strategic decisions.”96 Second, 
because a TPLF consumer must pay the financier with the proceeds of 
the lawsuit, the consumer might feel pressured to resist settlement in 
hopes of receiving a larger sum of money.97 
With regard to the first concern, most financiers are aware of the 
ethical issues this practice would raise and accordingly disclaim control 
over strategy or settlement decisions.98 The ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct also address this issue by restricting limitations 
on an attorney’s independent judgment. According to commentary 
accompanying Rule 1.7, “Loyalty and independent judgment are 
essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”99 
Additionally, Rule 1.8(f) states that a lawyer shall not accept 
compensation from a third party unless “there is no interference with 
the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-
lawyer relationship.”100 But given that these rules govern only attorney 
conduct, these measures alone are likely insufficient to mitigate 
concerns over financier control.  
With regard to the second concern, litigation financing serves to 
lessen any resource disparity between the parties that might otherwise 
impact settlement decisions. Because financiers have a strong incentive 
not to fund frivolous litigation,101 TPLF actually promotes the 
settlement of meritorious claims. This is because TPLF “forc[es] a 
recalcitrant defendant to approach a case reasonably and pragmatically 
in light of the fact that its adversary has the resources to meaningfully 
 
 96. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 4–5. 
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. See FAQ, supra note 48 (“We don’t get any rights to manage the litigation in which we 
invest, unless a client sells us a judgment or engages us specifically to manage as well as finance 
litigation. . . . Nor do we get any rights to control the settlement of the litigation . . . .”). 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1. 
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f). 
 101. See Richmond, supra note 89, at 27. 
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prosecute the matter.”102 Thus, while TPLF agreements may lead some 
plaintiffs to resist settlement based solely on their TPLF contracts, the 
benefits of TPLF in promoting the settlement of meritorious claims 
outweigh this burden.  
Accordingly, this Note proposes a regulatory solution that 
details an absolute prohibition of any decisionmaking authority by the 
financier over strategic litigation decisions.103 And to better alleviate 
concerns over settlement incentives, this Note also proposes several 
limitations on TPLF agreements to soften their influence on case 
disposition.104 
C. Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product Protection 
Waivers 
Another significant concern is that communications between 
attorneys and TPLF financiers may constitute a waiver of attorney-
client privilege or attorney work product protection.105 By satisfying a 
financier’s demands during the due diligence process, an attorney may 
be required to disclose information within the scope of the privilege or 
the work product doctrine, thus rendering the information discoverable 
by opposing counsel.106  
This concern poses a real obstacle to the use of TPLF, but it can 
be managed, as financiers typically only request information that is 
ordinarily discoverable by the opposing party anyway.107 To ensure this 
remains the case, this Note proposes express limitations on the types of 
information financiers may request, thus preserving these protections 




 102. Id. 
 103. See infra Section IV.C. 
 104. See infra Section IV.C. 
 105. See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 381 (2009) 
(“[T]here are work product and privilege issues that must be addressed if information is to be 
shared with a third party seeking to price and assume litigation risk from a defendant.”); see also 
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 6 (“TPLF investments compromise the 
attorney-client relationship and diminish the professional independence of attorneys by inserting 
a new party into the litigation equation whose sole interest is making a profit on its investment.”). 
 106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 107. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 186 (2014) 
(“[M]ost of the information that a third-party funder will need to evaluate a lawsuit is factual 
information of the sort that is discoverable by the adversary in any event.”). 
 108. See infra Section IV.C. 
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III. THE “RULES” OF LITIGATION FINANCE: DIVERGENT STATE 
APPROACHES 
Today, the “rules” of litigation finance are an amalgam of state-
level legislative enactments and court decisions.109 TPLF is not 
currently regulated at the federal level, and state regulation varies 
immensely. In 2007, Maine became the first state to pass legislation 
regulating litigation-finance agreements.110 A number of states have 
since followed, including Oklahoma,111 Nebraska,112 and Ohio.113 
Several more states are presently considering legislation that would 
regulate TPLF agreements, and it is likely that the complex state-based 
framework of regulation will continue to grow.114  
The broad range of state approaches to TPLF regulation has 
resulted in a number of substantive differences in how consumers and 
financiers across the country engage in TPLF. These differences arise 
from whether agreement-disclosure requirements are imposed, how 
underwriting is performed, and how private citizens obtain funding 
compared to corporations, among other differences.115 Further, because 
states disagree over whether TPLF should be permitted in the first 
 
 109. See Mikey Abts, The Current State of Litigation Finance Legislation: Part 1, LITIG. FIN. 
J. (June 2, 2017), https://litigationfinancejournal.com/current-state-litigation-finance-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/WS2S-9YHY] (examining the different attempts by state legislatures to regulate 
litigation finance). 
 110. See Maine Consumer Credit Code Legal Funding Practices, ch. 394, 2007 Me. Laws 965 
(codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 to -107 (2008)); Steinitz & Field, supra note 67, 
at 714 (discussing early state efforts to regulate litigation financing). 
 111. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, §§ 3-801 to -817 (2018) (setting forth licensing and bond 
requirements for TPLF financiers, contract specifications, and a range of prohibited activities and 
conduct).  
 112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3306 (2018) (establishing that communication between an attorney 
and TPLF provider as it pertains to nonrecourse litigation funding shall not “limit, waive, or 
abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or common-law privilege, including the work-product 
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege”). 
 113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2018) (establishing that TPLF agreements are 
valid and enforceable, provided they satisfy a number of contractual requirements). 
 114. South Carolina is one of the states currently considering regulating litigation finance. On 
February 8, 2017, legislation was introduced in the South Carolina Senate contemplating the 
imposition of certain requirements on consumer-litigation-funding companies. The legislation’s 
stated goal is to 
require a consumer litigation funding company to make certain disclosures on a 
litigation financing contract, to prohibit a consumer litigation funding company from 
taking certain actions, to require a consumer litigation funding company to provide 
notice and documents to a consumer’s attorney if the consumer is represented by 
counsel, and to require a consumer litigation funding company to submit an annual 
report containing certain information related to the company’s business and operations. 
S. 390, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017). 
 115. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
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place, the ability of consumers to even obtain TPLF services is 
geographically dependent.  
Sections III.A and III.B provide a broad outline of the various 
ways in which states have attempted to address and regulate TPLF. 
This list is not intended to be exhaustive; rather, its purposes are to 
highlight the more common state solutions to TPLF, to demonstrate the 
inherent tension among states’ approaches, and to examine how the 
lack of uniformity impacts consumer and commercial interests across 
the country. 
A. Prohibiting or Strongly Regulating TPLF 
In terms of the regulation and enforceability of TPLF 
agreements, a number of states are widely regarded as being hostile to 
litigation finance. Through either judicial pronouncement or 
legislation, these states have prohibited or strongly regulated TPLF. 
For those states that have dealt with litigation finance through 
judicial pronouncement, Alabama is perhaps the harshest. In Wilson v. 
Harris, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that a litigation-
finance agreement was void under an Alabama statute prohibiting 
gambling contracts and further held that TPLF is generally contrary to 
the public policy against champertous agreements.116 
Colorado has also addressed litigation financing through judicial 
pronouncement. In Oasis Legal Finance Group, LLC v. Coffman, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that TPLF agreements are loans 
(regardless of whether the duty to repay is on a contingency) and are 
thus subject to state usury laws.117 In doing so, the court “effectively 
disregarded express contract provisions,” and so “there is reason to 
think that Colorado courts will interpret litigation finance contracts 
very loosely and will not respect the strict terms of the agreement.”118 
Other states appear to have outlawed litigation-finance 
agreements through legislation. In Kentucky, the relevant statute 
provides: 
Any contract, agreement or conveyance made in consideration of services to be rendered 
in the prosecution or defense, or aiding in the prosecution or defense, in or out of court, of 
any suit, by any person not a party on record in the suit, whereby the thing sued for or in 
 
 116. 688 So. 2d 265, 270 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 
 117. 361 P.3d 400, 407–09 (Colo. 2015) (holding that the litigation-finance agreement “creates 
‘debt’ because it creates an obligation to repay” and that an unconditional obligation to repay is 
not required to subject the agreement to state usury laws as a loan). 
 118. Michael McDonald, The Best and Worst States for Litigation Finance (Part II), ABOVE L. 
(July 11, 2017, 5:33 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/the-best-and-worst-states-for-litigation 
-finance-part-ii [https://perma.cc/R75T-3HQ2]. 
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controversy or any part thereof, is to be taken, paid or received for such services or 
assistance, is void.119 
On its face, this statute would appear to render litigation-finance 
agreements void, though there is no Kentucky case law explicitly 
addressing this point. In a recent federal case, however, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky surmised that the 
Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that litigation-finance 
agreements violate the Kentucky statute proscribing champerty and 
the public policy of the commonwealth.120 
Finally, in some states that have begun to allow TPLF, strict 
requirements have been imposed on the amount of interest that 
litigation funders can charge.121 For example, a Tennessee statute 
prohibits litigation financiers from charging an interest rate above ten 
percent.122 In imposing such a limit on TPLF agreements, Tennessee 
has brought the practice more in line with the mainstream 
understanding of nonusurious interest rates.123  
B. Allowing or Lightly Regulating TPLF 
On the other end of the spectrum, many states are more 
welcoming (or at least less hostile) to the practice of TPLF. These states 
have largely addressed the practice through either judicial 
pronouncement or legislation as well, and at least one state has 
employed its attorney general’s office to lightly regulate TPLF 
financiers. 
Among the states that have addressed litigation funding 
through judicial pronouncement, the broadest endorsement comes from 
a Texas court of appeals, in Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. 
 
 119. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.060 (West 2018). 
 120. See Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00081-GNS-HBB, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 48098, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2017) (“In light of the undecided question of 
Kentucky law at issue, the Court concludes that the Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that the 
Agreements violate Kentucky public policy and the statute proscribing champerty for the reasons 
articulated in Stice.”). 
 121. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-16-101 to -110 (2018) (“All consumers entering into litigation 
financing transactions shall pay the litigation financier an annual fee of not more than ten percent 
(10%) of the original amount of money provided to the consumer for the litigation financing 
transaction.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 2251–2260 (2018); H.R. 1340, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Ind. 2015) (stating that the bill “[s]ets forth certain requirements and prohibitions with 
respect to CPAP transactions, including limits on the funded amount and specifications for the 
CPAP contract amount”). 
 122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-110(a). 
 123. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of modern usury laws. 
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v. Haskell.124 There, the court held that TPLF agreements are generally 
enforceable and that usury laws do not apply to them.125 
Like Texas courts, Florida courts have held that litigation-
finance agreements are enforceable.126 In Kraft v. Mason, a district 
court of appeal rejected the argument that the doctrine of champerty 
posed an absolute bar to litigation finance, but it did not explicitly 
recognize that usury laws do not apply to litigation-finance 
agreements.127 It is unlikely, however, that usury law would be applied 
specifically to nonrecourse TPLF, as other Florida courts have held that 
nonrecourse lending is not subject to usury laws.128  
New York courts have also expressly recognized the 
enforceability of litigation-finance agreements.129 Additionally, the New 
York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection, a division of the New 
York Attorney General’s Office, has undertaken a light form of 
regulation by entering into an agreement with a number of litigation 
funders, which is aimed at protecting consumers from entering finance 
contracts without a full understanding of the terms and their effect.130 
The agreement requires that “the consumer may cancel the contract 
within five business days following the consumer’s receipt of funds, 
without penalty or further obligation.”131 
As an example of statutory regulation, Ohio has passed 
legislation directly regulating litigation finance.132 Unlike the strict 
limits imposed by Tennessee and other states,133 Ohio’s limits are fairly 
minimal. Contracts must include various disclosures,134 attorneys 
cannot be required to have any duties contrary to the state’s rules of 
 
 124. See 193 S.W.3d 87, 104–05 (Tex. App. 2006) (“[W]e hold that the agreements do not violate 
Texas public policy.”). 
 125. Id. (holding that “agreements that are ‘champertous in nature’ ” are not automatically 
void). 
 126. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]his court holds 
that the trial court correctly found the contract in issue was neither champertous nor 
usurious . . . .”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See McDonald, supra note 118 (noting that litigation financiers place “particular 
emphasis [on Florida], in part due to the size of the state, but also because of settled case law”). 
 129. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 894, at *18 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“Under New York law these assignments are allowed as long as the 
primary purpose and intent of the assignment was for some reason other then [sic] bringing suit 
on that assignment.”). 
 130. New York AG Agreement with Legal Funding Companies, MIGHTY (Aug. 2, 2015), 
https://www.mighty.com/blog/nyattorneygeneralplaintifffundingagreement [https://perma.cc/ 
FFP9-UWJB]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2018). 
 133. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-16-101 to -110 (2018). 
 134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(1). 
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professional conduct,135 and consumers must be permitted to cancel the 
contract without penalty within five business days of receipt of funds.136 
The level of interest that financiers may charge is not limited. 
IV. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SOLUTION 
TPLF is a burgeoning industry that will continue to have a 
significant and lasting impact on the U.S. legal system. Through usury 
law and the common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty, 
states have addressed the rise of TPLF in a multitude of ways. This has 
ultimately led to a web of piecemeal regulations that have failed to 
uniformly protect important consumer interests or facilitate access to 
litigation funding. Because neither the beneficial nor the detrimental 
effects of TPLF are being adequately managed by state regimes, federal 
oversight is needed to ensure consumer and financier interests are 
balanced. 
Federal regulation is preferable to state regulation for several 
reasons. First, federal regulation creates uniformity by establishing a 
single regime to oversee TPLF in all fifty states. Aside from promoting 
a general interest in fairness by ensuring access to litigation finance 
nationwide, a uniform system of regulation would eliminate forum-
shopping issues. Because some states are far more hostile to litigation 
finance than others, TPLF financiers are most likely to do business in 
those states with the most relaxed rules and thus the weakest 
oversight.137 Federal regulation would eliminate the need for litigants 
to enter choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses, thus allowing all 
TPLF consumers to be accorded the same degree of protection. Further, 
uniform regulation ensures that consumers will not be unduly coerced 
into these contracts by financiers that target jurisdictions with the least 
restrictive litigation-finance lending requirements and thus the least 
protection of consumer interests.138  
 
 135. Id. § 1349.55(C). 
 136. Id. § 1349.55(B)(2). 
 137. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 9 (noting concerns with “a 
checkerboard of disparate state laws, rules, and regulations that apply only within any given state, 
and which, owing to the differences among the state oversight regimes, likely would funnel TPLF-
financed cases to the state courts in the jurisdictions with the weakest oversight regimes”). 
 138. See Michael McDonald, The Best and Worst States for Litigation Finance (Part I), ABOVE 
L. (June 28, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/06/the-best-and-worst-states-for-
litigation-finance-part-i [https://perma.cc/4STD-HBJ5] (noting that choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses are used to control TPLF agreements under the jurisdiction of states who have 
shown acceptance of these agreements). 
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Litigation financing is also frequently used to fund the most 
expensive and complex suits, which often end up in federal court.139 It 
is therefore logical, as will be discussed in further detail below, to 
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to effect an important 
procedural reform.  
In total, the inherent dangers of TPLF are not adequately 
addressed under the current patchwork of state regulations. A federal 
regulatory regime is thus necessary to protect consumers’ financial 
interests without compromising the growth of the litigation-finance 
industry. 
This Note contends that the best manner of regulating litigation 
finance is by delegating authority to the CFPB to promulgate and 
administer regulatory safeguards. To fairly and effectively balance the 
consumer and financier interests discussed in Part II, these safeguards 
must necessarily include creating negotiating parity between 
consumers and financiers, eliminating financier control over litigation 
strategy, and protecting against disclosure of privileged information. In 
order for the CFPB to effectively administer these safeguards, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to require 
disclosure of TPLF agreements at the outset of all litigation. 
A. Constitutional Authority to Regulate TPLF 
In order to authorize the CFPB to regulate TPLF, Congress must 
have the authority to regulate TPLF. As the ILR has noted, “TPLF 
investors operate nationally (and internationally), and use the means 
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., the mails, 
telecommunications, and money transfers) to carry out their 
business.”140 As a result, Congress can regulate TPLF under the 
commerce power as interstate commerce141 or, alternatively, as 
economic activity that “substantially affects” interstate commerce 
under United States v. Lopez.142  
Under the substantial effects test, even those litigation funders 
that engage in purely intrastate financing would be subject to 
regulation because, in the “aggregate,” their activities would have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.143 After Lopez, however, the 
 
 139. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 8 (arguing that most TPLF 
activity is likely to occur in federal court). 
 140. Id. 
 141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 142. 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).  
 143. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 
(1942) (holding that intrastate activity may be regulated under the commerce power where the 
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Supreme Court held in United States v. Morrison that “Lopez’s review 
of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where 
we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon 
the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in 
question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”144 After Morrison, 
application of the substantial effects test to TPLF likely depends on 
courts’ recognition of litigation finance as an economic activity. Given 
the similarities between TPLF and the other sorts of loan and credit 
activities that the federal government already regulates under the 
commerce power, it is likely that TPLF would be found to be economic 
activity within the scope of the substantial effects test. 
B. Delegating Authority to the CFPB 
The CFPB is not only constitutionally authorized to regulate 
TPLF but well situated to do so. The CFPB operates as an independent 
agency within the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, as 
established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.145 The Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose of the 
agency is to “enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for 
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for 
consumer financial products and services and that markets for 
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and 
competitive.”146 The Federal Register website describes the purpose of 
the CFPB as “promot[ing] fairness and transparency for mortgages, 
credit cards, and other consumer financial products and services.”147 
The purpose of the agency aligns neatly with regulation of the 
litigation-finance industry. Atmospherically, both TPLF and the sorts 
of loan and credit agreements the CFPB regulates raise the same sorts 
of concerns. These include liquidity and financial risk and the potential 
 
failure to do so would significantly limit the effectiveness of comprehensive congressional 
regulation over an interstate economic activity). 
 144. 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 145. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481–5603 (2012). It should be noted that there have been a number of 
challenges in recent years to the constitutionality of the CFPB. One court has recently upheld the 
agency’s structure against constitutional challenge. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing that the 
CFPB’s sole director could be removed by the president only for cause). At least one other court, 
however, subsequently held that the CFPB’s structure is unconstitutional. See Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the 
CFPB’s composition violates separation of powers requirements). The ultimate resolution of these 
complex constitutional questions is uncertain and accordingly beyond the scope of this Note. 
 146. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a). 
 147. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/ 
agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
A4BX-EBLQ]. 
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for consumer abuse. Because TPLF agreements are similar to activities 
the CFPB already regulates, the promulgation of new TPLF regulations 
would come from an agency familiar with the issues TPLF presents. 
The CFPB has also previously indicated a willingness to assert 
regulatory authority over the litigation-finance industry. In February 
2017, the CFPB, together with the New York Attorney General’s Office, 
filed a lawsuit in federal court against RD Legal Funding, two related 
entities, and the company’s founder for allegedly luring 9/11 victims 
and National Football League concussion victims into illegal funding 
agreements.148 The defendants were in the business of advancing funds 
to consumers entitled to compensation under settlement agreements.149 
The CFPB alleged, in part, that these transactions were falsely 
marketed as assignments rather than as loans and that the lending 
violated New York usury laws.150  
Although the CFPB has not yet asserted regulatory authority 
over presettlement litigation funding, which the bulk of this Note’s 
proposals target, the agency’s willingness to subject settlement-funding 
agreements to state usury laws bolsters the notion that the litigation-
finance industry fits naturally within the scope of the agency’s duty to 
“protect[ ] consumers in the financial marketplace” from “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.”151 This does not necessarily 
suggest that the regulation of presettlement litigation funding is 
already within the authority of the CFPB but rather that it would be 
well suited to the task if given congressional authorization.  
Therefore, Congress should statutorily authorize the CFPB to 
administer federal TPLF regulation.152 Through this authorization, the 
CFPB should then promulgate rules instituting, at the bare minimum, 
the following proposed safeguards. 
 
 148. See RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 746, 749. 
 149. Id. at 746. 
 150. Id. at 748–49; see also CFPB and New York Attorney General Sue RD Legal for Scamming 
9/11 Heroes out of Millions of Dollars in Compensation Funds, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-new-york-
attorney-general-sue-rd-legal-scamming-911-heroes-out-millions-dollars-compensation-funds 
[https://perma.cc/BV98-4WHM] (listing allegations against RD Legal). 
 151. The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/the-bureau (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AW6D-TCZD]. 
 152. Given the uncertainty of today’s political climate, it is difficult to predict when and with 
whose support this legislation would pass. Such predictions are accordingly beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
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C. Essential Components of the Regulatory Solution 
First, interest rates should be brought in line with fair 
commercial practices.153 This requires setting a maximum interest rate 
that TPLF financiers may charge. Specifically, a twenty-percent limit 
on commercial TPLF and a ten-percent limit on consumer TPLF should 
suffice. These rates would be sufficient to protect less sophisticated 
consumers and discourage frivolous litigation while still facilitating 
consumer- and commercial-TPLF lending. A twenty-percent 
commercial-TPLF cap does not exceed the average maximum interest 
rate set by states—six to twenty percent—and would thus bring 
commercial-TPLF agreements more in line with what states deem to be 
nonusurious lending.154 A ten-percent limit on consumer TPLF would 
also be more in line with average interest rates and provide additional 
protection for less sophisticated consumers—protection that is not 
necessarily needed in the commercial-TPLF context (where the average 
sophisticated TPLF client can more readily understand and absorb the 
impact of the finance agreement).155 
Limiting interest rates will likely shift the risk calculus for 
financiers such that they will be less inclined to advance funds to those 
suits in which their reduced recovery will not justify the risk of 
advancing those funds. These limits will provide important benefits 
without unreasonably limiting financier incentives. Interest caps are a 
potent means of protecting against unfair lending, and in the consumer-
TPLF context specifically, limiting maximum interest rates will lessen 
the impact of lender recovery on unsophisticated plaintiffs. Moreover, 
because interest caps will lessen financiers’ potential recovery, capping 
interest rates may also reduce the incentive to back suits with lower 
chances of success. This would further discourage commercial and 
consumer financiers from funding those suits that might be described 
as frivolous. 
The second necessary regulatory component involves 
implementing a strict policy that limits litigation financiers’ control 
over litigation strategy.156 Because TPLF financiers’ focus is to obtain a 
 
 153. See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance 
Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 73–74 (2004) (discussing 
examples of how litigation financiers “are making attempts to institutionalize their industry, to 
improve their image by being more forthcoming on the rates they are charging, to keep those rates 
closer to credit card rates, and to become more involved in their communities”). 
 154. See supra Section I.B; see also Cremades, supra note 1, at 160 (discussing the history of 
state restrictions on interest rates). 
 155. See supra Section I.B. 
 156. See Richmond, supra note 89, at 29 (examining how litigation-funding agreements can be 
structured to avoid any undue influence of financiers over litigation strategy); Steinitz & Field, 
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maximum return on their investment, they have strong incentives to 
exert control over decisions made by lawyers during the course of 
litigation.157 Although the ABA Model Rules guide attorneys’ conduct in 
protecting the objectivity of their judgment,158 the rules do not apply to 
TPLF financiers, and so an explicit regulatory prohibition on financiers’ 
control over any aspect of a lawyer’s independent judgment is needed. 
Through the promulgation of a rule expressly prohibiting financier 
control, lawyers will not be asked to compromise their independent 
judgment, and client interests will not take a back seat to the financiers’ 
interests. 
The third necessary regulatory component entails expressly 
limiting the types of disclosures TPLF financiers can request during 
due diligence, so as to avoid conflict-of-interest issues related to 
attorney work product and the attorney-client privilege.159 While 
assessing whether to finance a particular suit or in monitoring a suit’s 
progress, a financier could request that an attorney divulge protected 
information under the terms of a finance agreement. This, in turn, could 
result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product 
protection.160 To protect against privilege and work product issues 
related to such disclosures, financiers’ requests should be limited to 
information that would ordinarily be discoverable under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26.161  
Naturally, this disclosure limitation cannot be so onerous as to 
deprive financiers of information necessary to value a suit, so the CFPB 
should promulgate rules to permit certain additional disclosures as are 
deemed necessary to facilitate access to funding. The decision of what 
additional disclosures are necessary should rely heavily on whether 
 
supra note 67, at 728 (advocating for a model litigation-funding contract in which financiers gain 
“influence over the litigation, but not control”). 
 157. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 22 (“ALF suppliers are businesses, operated 
with the goal of maximizing return on investments. The investments are in legal claims, acquired 
in whole or in part. The interests of a supplier in any given transaction, therefore, will be to 
maximize the expected value of a legal claim.”). 
 158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that 
“independent judgment” is one of the “essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship with a 
client”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting 
compensation from a third party unless “there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence 
of professional judgment”). 
 159. See Molot, supra note 105, at 391, 420 (discussing conflict-of-interest issues related to 
TPLF agreement disclosures and noting that “the same common interest privilege that is often 
invoked when litigants need to share information with conventional liability insurers and potential 
acquirers” should extend to disclosures to litigation financiers). 
 160. J. Randolph Evans & Shari L. Klevens, The Growing Acceptance of Litigation Finance, 
LAW.COM (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://www.law.com/sites/dailyreportonline/2017/10/09/the-
growing-acceptance-of-litigation-finance [https://perma.cc/36DT-C67B]. 
 161. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (listing the general provisions governing discovery). 
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disclosure of the requested type of information is ordinarily protected 
by the work product doctrine or if disclosure would fall within the 
common-interest exception of the attorney-client privilege.162 Under 
these guidelines, the implementation of disclosure limits would protect 
attorney and client interests without significantly burdening TPLF 
financiers’ ability to conduct due diligence. 
Lastly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended 
to mandate disclosure of TPLF agreements in all litigation.163 Although 
federal courts may already have discretion to order the production of 
TPLF agreements during discovery—at least one court has adopted a 
local rule requiring disclosure of TPLF agreements in class-action 
suits164—mandating disclosure in all suits will promote transparency 
and aid the CFPB in ensuring compliance with the aforementioned 
safeguards. And as the ILR has noted, “[B]ecause many states have 
modeled their rules of civil procedure on the federal rules and 
periodically adopt changes in the federal rules for use in their own 
courts,” amending the federal rules would likely lead to changes in state 
rules as well, which further promotes CFPB administration of the 
safeguards.165 
Mandating disclosure up front will also promote speedy 
determinations related to cost shifting—which ultimately leads to more 
efficient use of judicial resources—and will allow courts to police the 
ethical obligations of attorneys more readily. Moreover, because courts 
may already require disclosure of TPLF agreements, it is unlikely this 
amendment would have any significant impact on financiers’ interests.  
CONCLUSION 
TPLF is now a powerful and influential industry that will play 
a significant role in reshaping the legal landscape. At present, the 
important interests of parties engaging TPLF services, along with the 
sheer amount of funding being infused into the legal system overall, 
 
 162. For further discussion of the common-interest exception and work product doctrine in 
relation to TPLF, see ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 34–36. 
 163. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 14 (arguing that Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 7.1 and 28 should be amended to require disclosure of third-party-funder 
identities and relevant investment details). 
 164. N.D. CAL. R. 3-15; Ben Hancock, Northern District, First in Nation, Mandates Disclosure 
of Third-Party Funding in Class Actions, LAW.COM (Jan. 23, 2017, 10:07 PM), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202777487488 [https://perma.cc/K8XP-5CNQ] (“The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on Monday announced a new rule 
requiring the automatic disclosure of third-party funding agreements in proposed class-action 
lawsuits, walking back from an earlier proposal for broader transparency requirements.”). 
 165. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 8 (arguing that most TPLF 
activity is likely to occur in federal court). 
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warrant careful oversight to ensure that litigation finance is fair and 
equitable. On the other hand, litigation finance has greatly improved 
the ability of plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims and has provided 
commercial entities with a new and useful budgeting and risk-
spreading tool. To best promote the interests of consumers and 
financiers alike, a federal regulatory regime administered by the CFPB 
along with a mandatory-disclosure requirement under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure should be implemented. 
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